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Until the beginning of 1950s, the economic 
theory in general, and the microeconomic 
theory in particular, relied totally on the de-
terministic character of economic pheno-
mena. Nowadays microeconomic models 
are built on uncertain elements in a com-
petitive environment that is affected by risk 
and uncertainty. Two centuries later, tradi-
tional microeconomics, also known as de-
rived microeconomics, continues to be 
based on Adam Smith’s theory. As individu-
als are interested in participating in com-
mercial transactions, but for these to take 
place effectively, two essential principles 
should be observed: the principle of ratio-
nality and the principle of pure and perfect 
competition. The link between Brower’ fixed 
point theorems on the one hand and John 
von Neumann’s minimax theorem on the 
other hand enabled other authors such as 
McKenzie Arrow and Debreu Uzawa to state 
and demonstrate simpler but more general 
theorems than that of Abraham Wald. It was thus supposed that 
consumer preferences in a pool of possible consumptions are ref-
lexive, transitive and all are comparable. Using game theory as a 
reference framework to represent the behavior of economic agents, 
microeconomics strongly renews its scope of investigation. The 
problem that arises is no longer linked to the study of perfectly com-
petitive markets, but mostly to how agents coordinate their deci-
sions in different strategic configuration circumstances. The use of 
such concepts as risk, antiselection or coordination limits has 
opened new scopes to economy in general and to microeconomics 
in particular. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Microeconomics, as a branch of economics, studies the 
individual behavior of economic agents that get informed, 
set strategies to follow and make decisions. Until the 
beginning of 1950s, the economic theory in general, and 
the microeconomic theory in particular, relied totally on 
the deterministic character of economic phenomena. 
Nowadays microeconomic models are built on uncertain 
elements in a competitive environment that is affected by 
risk and uncertainty. 
Two centuries later, traditional microeconomics, also 
known as derived microeconomics, continues to be based 
on Adam Smith’s theory. As individuals are interested in 
participating in commercial transactions, but for these to 
take place effectively, two essential principles should be 
observed: the principle of rationality and the principle of 
pure and perfect competition. The transactions among 
economic agents take place according to well-defined 
rules that are formalized in the Walrasian model, 
according to which it is not the producers and the 
consumes that decide the price, but the market clearing 
price is established through a tâtonnement process by a 
Walrasian auctioneer. Traditional microeconomic analysis
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describes and explains the functioning of an economy 
based on the individual behavior of economic agents in 
terms of production or consumption decision-making. [1] 
One of the main objectives of traditional microeconomics 
is to state necessary conditions to reach economic 
equilibrium. The equilibrium principle is based on the 
hypothesis that the price set in the transaction between 
producers and consumers undergoes continuous 
adjustments, to the point where demand and supply 
become equal at the respective price. The market is in 
equilibrium when the quantities of goods that buyers want 
to obtain at the existing prices are equal to those that 
sellers offer in the same conditions. 
Problems pertaining to the general equilibrium theory are 
classified in two major categories:  the existence and 
setting of equilibrium, on the one hand, and the optimality 
of the system state in the dynamic case, on the other. 
Starting from these two problems, the general equilibrium 
theory has greatly developed after the 1930s due to two 
mainstreams: the first, which emerged in the German 
literature, deals with the existence and the uniqueness of 
equilibrium; the second, which is rather present in the 
English literature, deals with problems related to stability 
and comparative statics. Zeuten (1932), Neisser (1932) 
and Stackelberg (1933) showed in different ways that the 
problem of equilibrium existence is much deeper than the 
simple equality of equations and the determination of the 
unknown coefficient. Schlesinger and Abraham Wald 
provided a rigorous analysis of the general competitive 
equilibrium. 
It is in the same period that John von Neumann brought a 
major contribution to the general equilibrium theory in a 
related research field, i.e. the game theory. Thus, a set of 
general notions that were stated in the equilibrium theory 
were developed by the game theory. In this respect, we 
mention the concept of the core, which is identical to 
Edgeworth's  contract curve. It  wa s  f ormul at ed by  Gi lli es 
(1953) and further developed by Shubik and Scarf in 
papers published between 1959 and 1962. 
The link between Brower’ fixed point theorems on the one 
hand and John von Neumann’s minimax theorem on the 
other hand enabled other authors such as McKenzie 
Arrow and Debreu Uzawa to state and demonstrate 
simpler but more general theorems than that of Abraham 
Wald. It was thus supposed that consumer preferences in 
a pool of possible consumptions are reflexive, transitive 
and all are comparable. These hypotheses define the so-
called  transitive equilibrium.  Starting from 1974, Mas-
Colell has shown that the existence of general equilibrium 
in a finite economy can be established without these 
a x i o m s  o f  t r a n s i t i v i t y  o r  c o m p l e t e n e s s  o f  c o n s u m e r  
preferences in the pool of possible consumptions, defining 
such equilibrium as intransitive. 
Based on the Walrasian model, together with such 
elements as: rationality of households that maximize their 
utility; profit maximization by companies; existence of 
production functions for superior goods; inexistence of 
monetary illusion, two new elements may be introduced in 
research: information imperfection and transaction 
monetization. While in traditional microeconomics the 
information is perfect, in reality information acquisition is 
time-consuming and expensive, and it is possible that 
certain transactions take place inappropriately. 
In the traditional Walrasian model, supply and demand 
are matched through a process called tâtonnement, or 
groping, relating to finding the equilibrium price; in reality 
agents have no element that allows them to distinguish 
between the market clearing (equilibrium) price and a 
random, incorrect price. They can only set prices 
subsequently to getting informed, while the economic 
transaction does not remain fix throughout this 
information-gathering period as production continues, 
other transactions take place and particularly a great deal 
of the time available is already allotted to collecting 
information. Faced with the new information and taking 
into account the past information, the economic agent will 
analyze the strategy to follow in future. 
Considering the strategic interactions among economic 
agents that take place in the perfect competition model, 
we can state that there is no influence among them, as 
the price is a given price and the economic agents have 
no influence on it whatsoever. The following questions 
may arise: What happens with the relationship among 
economic agents that act in real economy? What about 
the internal organization of investments which rules the 
economic relationships and which does not appear in the 
general equilibrium model? etc. 
  A major limitation of the general equilibrium theory 
pertains to information. In the general equilibrium model, 
economic agents are perfectly informed. If we take 
uncertainty into consideration, the choices of economic 
agents are made taking into account the asymmetry of 
information. The approaches that were made to integrate 
information asymmetry into the general equilibrium model 
were successful. The economic agent that is the sole 
holder of an information item at a certain point will hold a 
partial monopoly for a short period of time and will try to 
exploit this. Traditional microeconomics is not a “laisser-
faire” theory. That is why overcoming the Walrasian 
market fiction represents the starting point for new 
microeconomics. 
Due to their complexity and multitude, socio-economic 
phenomena need to be studied by using various 
approaches and research instruments. Economic sciences 
greatly evolved in terms of introduction and large scale 
use of mathematic techniques and methods. These 
enable the elaboration of abstract theoretical methods 
that help study the progress of economic phenomena. 
Economic reality cannot be appropriately illustrated by a 
s t a t i c  a p p r o a c h ,  a s  i s  t h e  c a s e  o f  t r a d i t i o n a l  
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microeconomic theory, but it should be regarded as 
process, through a dynamic approach, as is the case of 
new microeconomics. The economic models and the 
practice of economical - mathematics constituted an 
excellent instrument for studying the economic games, 
stimulating the research in this field. In the last decade, a 
series of methods regarding the representation of the 
economic theory were used in order to study the evolution 
of state parameters of the social- economic field. The 
category of systems highly studied in the economic 
dynamism are those who pattern the business circle, 
patterns of economic increase and patterns which study 
the costs game in a dynamic perspective. In the last 
decade, from time to time, evolution and chaotic behavior 
were noticed in the economic patterns. The main 
conception of the economics was demonetized, which 
says that the economic balances are constant even with 
the lack of external shocks, the economy leaning towards 
a stationary state [2]. 
Preoccupied by the problem of economic quantification 
and by the rigorous expression of the relations between 
them, the marginality school of the economic thinking 
contributed to the enrichment of the analytical instrument 
from this field and enriched a lot the problematic of 
economics, emphasizing the modernity. The importance of 
knowing the market mechanisms, the ratio between costs 
and the others economic variables is in general 
recognized at microeconomic and macroeconomic level. 
The economic agent (named player in the game theory), 
seller or producer must define its behavior and formulate 
strategies for future actions. The companies are 
interested in the elaboration of favorable strategies, which 
many times go low to the price game. From this point of 
view, conducting a study in a dynamic environment, about 
costs mechanism seems to be a very important problem 
[3]. Taking into account the cost which is an economic 
phenomenon, this work trying to approach it, using a 
modern instrument of work, belonging exclusively to 
mathematics, which is the game theory. We are interested 
in the theoretical results which are revealed in literature 
regarding the theory of games starting with the key 
concepts of this one: games, strategies, balance, game 
value, etc. the research is focused on the main oligopoly 
market structures from the microeconomics point of view. 
New microeconomics is based on market imperfection 
and it aims at studying the behavior of rational individuals 
in a world where information is not perfectly and 
permanently available. Based on the limitations of the 
Walrasian model, new microeconomics studies the 
behavior of economic agents that act in an uncertain 
environment where imperfect information affects strategic 
interaction. 
New microeconomics preserves the rationality axiom and 
has two instruments of analysis: game theory and 
information economy. The two instruments of analysis of 
new microeconomics are interdependent provided the 
agents (called players in terms of game theory) act in 
conditions of risk and uncertainty. 
Game theory, the first instrument of analysis, studies the 
consequences of conflicting relationships among 
economic agents in situations of risk and uncertainty. 
Information economy is the second instrument of new 
microeconomics and  studies agents’ behavior when 
confronted with the problem of information acquisition 
regarding the goods and services on the market.  
The merit of new microeconomics is that it enables the 
study of economic agents’ behavior in a much more 
complex environment than that of traditional 
microeconomics, beyond the fiction of Walrasian markets 
where the auctioneer coordinates the decisions of 
individuals. The following question arises: Why is new 
microeconomics necessary? 
The answer is based on the following arguments: 
1.  traditional microeconomics presents relatively simple 
theories, with few variables, generally neglected 
measures, while it is these variables that are usually 
relevant for real economy;  
2.  the approach of traditional microeconomic theory 
presents a major drawback, i.e.: by presenting exact 
and simplified theories, real economic life is often 
quite impossible to be theorized. 
3.  there is an obvious discrepancy between the level of 
economic science and economic realities of 1930s - 
1940s, on the one hand, and the current economic 
realities, on the other hand. 
The new microeconomics is based on the imperfection of 
the real markets, affected by risk and uncertainty. The 
study regarding the behavior of the economic agents is 
conducted in a business environment where the intelli-
gence is not completely and constantly available. Sticking 
to the hypothesis of rationality the new microeconomics 
has two important instruments of analysis: the theory of 
games and the intelligence economy.  
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The theory of games was first mentioned and historically 
related to the year 1944 when the mathematician John 
von Neumann and the economist Oskar Morgenstern 
publish the famous work: Theory of Games and Economic 
Behavior [4]. This work represented the first mathematic 
pattern which included people as rational human beings. 
After a period of growing up, influenced by works of J.F. 
Nash (1951), R.D. Luce and H. Raiffa (1957), L. Shapley 
(1953), the theory of games becomes by the end of the 
‘80 a strong instrument for analyzing the situations of 
strategic interaction, introduced in the works of J.W. 
Friedmann (1986), D.M. Kreps (1990), D. Fundenberg 
and J. Tirole (1991), A. Mass - Colell (1995) and P. Cahuc 
(1998). [4] Even if the theory of games is quite recent, the 
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kind of problematic in a more restricted manner[4]. 
The theory of games studies the human behavior in 
situations of conflict, where the reason is contrary to the 
reason, each of the parties involved being able to analyze 
and to decide in order to reach their own targets. It 
emphasizes the meaning of the rationality hypothesis 
when the contentment of a person is directly affected by 
the other agents’ decisions and defines solutions for 
various situations of conflict. The theory of games is a 
method of research for strategic interaction situations, 
where the economic agents are aware of the 
interdependence which exists between them and each of 
them will make their own decisions taking into account 
the others’ behavior. 
Augustin Cournot studied in 1838 the operation of the 
oligopoly markets where each company takes action 
knowing that its volume of production affects the market 
cost. In 1833 J.  Bertrand  studied the operation of the 
oligopoly markets where the companies with constant 
efficiencies produce the same product settling the selling 
price[9]. The result mentioned by Bertrand is known as 
Bertrand paradox. In 1934 Stackelberg shows that some 
companies can be the leader and that they are able to 
impose the price to the others. The leader company, as a 
barometer company, knows the market situation best and 
has the means necessary in order to control the counter 
party. This doesn’t mean that the company is the most 
powerful but well informed and organized. The following 
question comes up: Which of the behaviors mentioned 
above should be followed? In order to answer this 
question, a theory was needed which could explain the 
interactions between companies. This is the great 
contribution of the game theory [5]. It allows the 
elaboration of an analytical framework regarding the 
situations when an agent’s decisions can affect the 
earnings of the other agents. The theory of games studies 
the manner in which the rational decision is made by 
people in interactive situations when the results of their 
action depend directly on the others’ actions. In this case, 
where the coordination of the individual actions is 
adjusted by competition, each economic agent (named 
player in the game theory) must forecast the future 
actions of the other agents and then optimize their own 
behavior depending on the results. In the last two decades 
the rent-seeking type of dynamic games were analyzed (to 
share the fortune). A systematic study of the balance point 
for this kind of games was made by Okuguchi K. and 
Szidarovsky F. who revealed that these games are equal 
to the Cournot type of oligopoly with price hyperbolic 
function[7]. 
Summarizing the phrases mentioned above, three stages 
of evolution were identified regarding the theory of games: 
1) beginning with the ’20 until the end of the II nd World 
War. In all this time the strategic games and their 
extensions were elaborated, military tactics games, 
especially those with zero-sum. The strategic researches 
are emphasized serving the at maximum the purpose of 
settling the possible solutions of these games; 
2) the period which starts with the work John von 
Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern  „Theory of Games and 
Economic Behavior” (1944) and ends with the ’70. The 
interest is focused on the cooperative  theory of games 
which finds important the coalitions formed between the 
rational persons in order to maximize their earnings; 
3) nowadays, the main place is given to the non-
cooperative games with Nash equilibrium considered to 
be a privileged solution as well as the dynamic games. 
The theory of games hyphens the meaning of the 
rationality hypothesis when the contentment of the person 
is directly affected by the decisions of the other agents 
and defines solutions for different situations of conflict [6]. 
Out of this reason knowing the analysis instruments of this 
theory is essential nowadays, the theory of games 
constituting a real matrix of the contemporary financial 
theory. Its postulates are based on the analysis of the 
people’s interdependent relations. The economic 
description and analysis must be oriented towards solving 
the conflicts caused by the problems of redistribution. The 
approach moves from solving problems related to 
assignment towards the analysis of the availability 
restrictions which influences the resources assignment 
and distribution. In conclusion, the economic reality can’t 
be properly presented by a static approach, as the 
traditional microeconomics theory does it, but it must be 
seen as a process, with the help of a dynamic approach, 
from the new microeconomics perspective.   
3. ADVANTAGES AND DRAWBACKS OF USING 
GAME THEORY IN NEW MICROECONOMICS 
Game theory provides a wide range of analysis 
instruments to identify inherent causes of market 
transactions. Its postulates are based on analyzing 
strategic interdependency links among economic agents. 
Based on the rationality axiom and taking into account the 
information available to economic agents (called players 
in terms of game theory), as well as the constraints 
imposed by the rules of the game, game theory provides 
numerous and extremely useful instruments[5]. 
Game theory demonstrates that the individual decisions of 
selfish economic agents are most often incompatible with 
the general interest, and lack of communication often 
determines agents to make inefficient choices. As a 
modern work instrument in economics, game theory may 
be used to analyze the inequality of transactions among 
agents, which inevitably undergo transaction costs. 
Therefore, game theory provides economic agents with a 
set of possible strategies (game scenarios) to simulate 
different market structures and particularly to formulate 
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and adopt decisions that lead to the best possible 
outcome[6]. 
Game theory uses efficient work instruments that enable 
the solving of important problems in microeconomics 
practice. For this reason, on the one hand, game theory is 
a wholly axiomatic mathematical instrument, as 
paradoxes discovered by game theorists refer to 
consequences that result from applying the rationality 
principle, while on the other hand, there are reserves 
regarding the beliefs related to the majority of solution 
concepts and in particular those related to Nash 
equilibrium.  
Although at first, the cooperative outcome, where each 
economic agent tries to find the solution of the game by 
invoking the players’ beliefs, is preferred, the cooperative 
game approach is not of major interest because players 
do not receive any kind of sanction in case they break the 
agreements. Microeconomic analysis, in terms of game 
theory, provides importance to Nash non-cooperative 
equilibriums. The respect of agreements ensures their 
conclusion because players are directly interested in this 
goal. Microeconomic analysis focuses on the hypothesis 
that each economic agent aims to maximize its own profit 
by adopting a non-cooperative approach.  
In general, a game is any situation where several 
autonomous decision-makers are called to make 
decisions that lead to different results. As a decision-
maker, each player obtains a result that depends on the 
decisions made by others. Rational choices, which aim at 
obtaining a maximum gain, essentially depend on the 
environment in which they are exercised (rules of the 
game) and on the information that is available to the 
players. 
 Special attention should be given to the coordination of 
individual decisions made within a non-cooperative 
environment, but also to the study of information 
asymmetry, which in its turn depends on the moral risk 
and antiselection. For this reason: 
•  game theory is an effective, modern instrument of 
economic analysis and the use of game theory 
concepts allows a better understanding and 
explaining of economic phenomena in general, and 
of prices in particular; 
•  game theory uses highly complex mathematical 
models, formally called games, for which it 
suggests a clear, accurate language to express 
ideas and in particular it enables the economic 
testing of such ideas. 
The above statements are based on two essential game 
theory features:  an extremely wide investigation scope 
(numerous situations that pertain or not to economics can 
be studied by using game theory), on the one hand, and 
the use of an extremely rigorous, coded and highly 
accurate set of rules, on the other hand. Although game 
theory mainly focuses on studying the rational decisions of 
economic agents, there are also surprise elements that 
intervene in real life, for which game theory proposes ways 
to identify the best decisions taking into account the 
economic agents’ preferences and available information. 
Game theory caused a major reconstruction in 
microeconomics, which in specialized literature is called 
new microeconomics. This reconstruction is achieved 
based on the principle of strategic interdependence, 
which in its turn is based on two essential aspects: 
a.  information asymmetry which is identified by 
means of incomplete information games (a series 
of concepts such as: adverse selection, risk, 
incentives, principal-agent model etc. are 
representative for such games); 
b.  cooperation and partnership strategies following 
negotiation, by which the actions of economic 
agents that accept or refuse to cooperate are put 
in concrete form.  
By using game theory, the decision-makers can better 
simulate various situations of strategic interaction, from 
the simplest game models (e.g. the simple duopoly game) 
to the most complex (e.g. the oligopoly game theory). It is 
important that these models be built as close as possible 
to the economic reality, by proposing simple formulations 
that are easy to retain by decision-makers based on 
minimum technical knowledge (linear functions, payment 
matrices, uniform probability distributions). 
Game theory presents a few drawbacks in terms of 
economic theory and practice, such as: 
1.  the rational behavior hypothesis is most often 
insufficient to foresee a unique result of strategic 
interactions that frequently lead to complex 
strategic situations which are difficult to solve; 
2.  game theory focuses on identifying and defining 
equilibrium concepts, but it does not explain how 
players choose their equilibrium strategy. 
3.  the existence of multiple equilibrium points may 
first seem an important advantage in case of 
dynamic games. Subsequently, these solutions 
need to be adjusted by referring to common past 
actions (game history) in order to estimate 
players’ choices correctly in future.  
Even though these limitations restrict the scope of game 
theory, this can definitely be extended.  
The economic level of the competition can be considered 
as a mechanism of resources allocation which allows, in 
many cases, the promotion of the economic efficiency. 
The game theory contribution to the development of the 
competition politics can solve some problems related to 
the price system and to the intelligence exchange. For this 
reason the notion of competition was and is related first to 
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second to the relative hypothesis of the market operation. 
When the coordination of the individual actions is 
adjusted by competition, each economic agent must 
forecast the other agents’ actions and then maximize 
depending on the results their own behavior. During the 
last decades, dynamic rent-seeking games have been 
analyzed. A systematic study of the existence of 
equilibrium points for these types of games proved that 
these games are equivalent to Cournot oligopoly. These 
dynamic games are analyzed by using specific methods 
from bifurcation theory and catastrophe theory. Other 
recent research refers to the making up of a duopoly 
model in which the decisions of the two players are made 
at the moment t and t-τ., where τ is a retarded time 
(delay), τ ≥ 0. This model reflects the analysis of economic 
games from a new perspective. The results reflect the 
existence of stable equilibrium states and equilibrium 
states near which the players’ behavior has a cyclic 
character. These states depend on the τ parameter, 
dynamics being described by a  s y s t e m  o f  d i f f e r e n t i a l  
equations with delayed time.  
4. CONCLUSIONS 
By using game theory as a reference framework to 
represent the behavior of economic agents, 
microeconomics strongly renews its scope of investigation. 
The problem that arises is no longer linked to the study of 
perfectly competitive markets, but mostly to how agents 
coordinate their decisions in different strategic 
configuration circumstances. The use of such concepts as 
risk, antiselection or coordination limits has opened new 
scopes to economy in general and to microeconomics in 
particular.  
The economic actors have different behaviors on the 
market which have different consequences depending on 
the number, relative size and strategies approached by 
the other economic actors. Starting with the rationality 
hypothesis when the agent’s contentment is affected by 
the others decisions the game theory defines solutions for 
solving the situations of conflict.  
In economy, structural changes and oscillations are the 
rule and not the exception and the stationary states 
become instable when certain parameters vary. The 
microeconomic models constitute nuclei of which 
macroeconomic models are conceived, because the 
parameters estimation for the last one depends on 
microeconomic model.  
Microeconomics is no longer concerned with studying the 
operation of perfectly competitive markets, but with 
analyzing how agents can coordinate their decisions in 
dynamic configurations in a competitive environment that 
is affected by risk and uncertainty. The progress made in 
the field of game theory leads to the conclusion that the 
relationship between game theory and new 
microeconomics opens the way to a new scope of 
research that can certainly be extended. 
In conclusion, game theory uses a rigorous and sufficiently 
flexible language to provide a set of explanations to 
current phenomena in real economy. The use of game 
theory as a reference framework in representing economic 
agents’ behavior has opened the way to a wide scope of 
investigation. The strategic interactions between players 
on the oligopoly market very often lead to extremely 
complex situations, the analysis of which is often difficult. 
The problem of the economic agents is no longer 
conducting studies for the operation of the perfect 
competition markets but to analyze the means in which 
they can coordinate the decisions, in dynamic 
configurations in a competitive environment affected by 
risk and uncertainty. 
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